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*  The Honorable William D. Hutchinson participated in the oral 
argument and decision in this case, but died before he could join 
or concur in this Opinion. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge:                      
 
 Maia Caplan and Vigilant Insurance Company (Vigilant) 
have brought this expedited appeal from the District Court's 
Order of May 25, 1995.  The order declared null and void an 
agreement between Vigilant and Caplan, settling a civil action, 
entitled Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey et al., 
which Caplan had brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
The May 25 Order also enjoined Caplan from entering into any 
settlement of the action unless defendants, Fellheimer Eichen 
Braverman & Kaskey (FEB&K) and David Braverman, were parties to 
the settlement. 
 The appellees, FEB&K and Braverman, have moved to 
dismiss the appeal on the grounds both that the May 25 Order is 
not an injunction appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
and that the order is interlocutory and does not fall within the 
"collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule.   
 Because we find that the May 25 Order is a preliminary 
injunction, we conclude that we do have appellate jurisdiction of 
the appeal.  We also conclude that Vigilant is a proper party to 
the appeal.  Finally, because we find that the district court 
erred in its assessment of the factors required to grant 
injunctive relief, we will reverse the Order of May 25 and remand 
this action to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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 I.  FACTS 
 In January 1995, Caplan filed a five count amended 
complaint against FEB&K, the law firm where she had formerly been 
employed, and against its managing partner Braverman, alleging: 
(1) violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, by 
creating a hostile environment for women at the firm and by 
sexually harassing Caplan's secretary; (2) negligent infliction 
of emotional distress; (3) tortious interference with existing 
and prospective contracts; (4) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and (5) defamation.  Defendants tendered the 
amended complaint to Vigilant, their liability insurance carrier. 
In February, Vigilant notified the defendants that it would 
provide a defense for them on all counts of the amended complaint 
but with a full reservation of rights.  Vigilant reserved its 
rights because it had determined that the first four counts of 
the amended complaint were not covered under the insurance 
contract.1   
 Defendants filed counterclaims against Caplan, 
asserting malicious abuse of process and civil conspiracy to 
maliciously abuse process.  The district court dismissed these 
                                                           
1Under Pennsylvania law, when an insured tenders multiple claims 
to an insurer for defense, the insurer is obligated to undertake 
defense of the entire suit as long as at least one claim is 
potentially covered by the policy.  See, e.g., American Contract 
Bridge League v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 71, 75 
(3d Cir. 1985).  As to indemnification, however, the insurer is 
obligated to its insured only for those damages which are 
actually within the policy coverage.  See, e.g., C.J. Heist 
Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1981).  
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counterclaims as premature because the underlying action had not 
been terminated in defendants' favor. 
 Vigilant's policy with FEB&K allows Vigilant to settle 
suits without FEB&K's consent.  The relevant provision of the 
insurance policy reads as follows:   
1.  We will defend claims or suits against 
the insured seeking damages to which this 
insurance applies.  We may make:   
 
a.  Such investigation of any 
occurrence, claim or suit, and 
 
b.  Such settlement within the 
applicable Amount of Insurance 
available; 
 
as we think appropriate. 
Appendix (App.) at 248.   
 In April 1995, Caplan and the defendants entered into 
settlement negotiations.  Although the parties came close to an 
agreement on monetary damages, they could not agree on other 
issues, including defendants' demand that Caplan issue a public 
retraction as part of any settlement.  When they could not agree 
on the wording of the public retraction, negotiations broke down. 
On May 17, attorneys for both parties informed the district judge 
that they could not reach a settlement.   
 At the same time as defendants were negotiating with 
Caplan, they were also negotiating with Vigilant to take over 
full defense and liability for the case in return for a payment 
to them by Vigilant of $190,000, the settlement amount that 
Caplan and defendants appeared to have agreed upon if Caplan 
5 
could be persuaded to issue a retraction.  These negotiations 
also broke down on May 17. 
  After the breakdown of negotiations, Vigilant's 
attorney wrote to the district judge on May 17, requesting a 
settlement conference.  All counsel agreed that such a conference 
would be helpful.  At the request of the district judge, the 
magistrate judge scheduled a conference for May 22.  On the 
morning of the conference, the defendants notified counsel for 
Caplan that they would not be attending because one of their 
attorneys was out of the country on vacation.  Caplan's counsel 
telephoned the magistrate judge's chambers to report defendants' 
absence.  Defendants did not notify Vigilant, and counsel for 
Vigilant appeared at the magistrate judge's chambers to 
negotiate.  In addition, Caplan herself did not receive notice 
that defendants and their counsel would be absent.  She came up 
from Washington, D.C., for the conference. 
 Although the conference was rescheduled, the magistrate 
judge encouraged those present to discuss the possibility of 
settlement.  That same day, Vigilant and Caplan came to an 
agreement under which Caplan would execute a general release of 
all claims in favor of defendants in return for Vigilant's 
payment to Caplan of $200,000.  Caplan signed the release and her 
attorneys executed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of 
the suit.  Both the release and the stipulation were to be held 
by Vigilant pending delivery of the settlement funds. 
 The following day, May 23, defendants filed an 
emergency motion with the district court, seeking an order 
6 
"temporarily restraining and, after hearing, preliminary [sic] 
enjoining Plaintiff and her counsel from taking any action 
whatsoever to consummate the purported 'settlement' arranged by 
Plaintiff and Defendants' insurance carrier without the knowledge 
and authorization of Defendants."  App. at 128.  In support of 
the motion, defendants asserted that if the injunction were not 
granted, defendants would "suffer irreparable harm" and that the 
"harm to Defendants outweighs the harm the injunctive relief 
sought may cause Plaintiff".  The potential harm to defendants, 
cited by them in their memorandum accompanying the motion, 
included the loss of the right to vindication at trial and a 
wrongful and irreparable deprivation of "the agreed to public 
retraction from Plaintiff".  Defendants claimed that their 
"legitimate interests will be severely prejudiced if the Court 
does not turn to its inherent equitable powers to grant 
Defendants' motion in order to prevent this injustice."  It is 
apparent from defendants' memorandum that their prime interest in 
voiding the settlement between Caplan and Vigilant was to be able 
to bring an action against Caplan for wrongful use of civil 
proceedings or for malicious prosecution.  Under Pennsylvania's 
malicious prosecution statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8351, an 
essential element of such an action is that the underlying 
litigation have terminated favorably to the defendant.  See Junod 
v. Bader, 458 A.2d 251 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that a 
compromise is not an outcome sufficiently favorable to a 
defendant to entitle him subsequently to bring a malicious 
prosecution action against his accuser). 
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 The district court held a hearing on the emergency 
motion at 4:15 p.m. on May 23.  Present at the hearing were the 
attorneys for Caplan, for Braverman, for FEB&K, and for Vigilant. 
Defendant Braverman was the only witness.  He testified that 
Caplan's suit had caused him and FEB&K embarrassment and loss of 
business in the amount of "tens of thousands of dollars a month" 
and that settlement of the suit without a public retraction from 
Caplan would prevent defendants from clearing their names.   
 Although Vigilant was not a party to the proceeding and 
had not made a motion to intervene, its counsel, Robert B. White, 
was present and wished to make a statement.  Counsel for FEB&K 
opposed any appearance by Vigilant on the basis that Vigilant had 
no standing to appear before the court. 
 The court, however, permitted White to speak.  White 
explained that the policy language gave Vigilant the unqualified 
right to settle actions in which it provided a defense.  He also 
represented that in return for the agreed settlement payment of 
$200,000, Vigilant had obtained a general release from Caplan 
covering all five counts, along with a stipulation of dismissal 
signed by Caplan's counsel.  White stated that the case was over 
and no injunction was necessary. 
 In its Order of May 25, the district court granted 
defendants' motion for injunctive relief.  In its Memorandum 
Opinion, the court recited the four factors a court must consider 
before granting injunctive relief:  1)  reasonable probability of 
success on the merits, 2) irreparable injury, 3) harm to the 
other party, and 4) public interest.   
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 In discussing likelihood of success on the merits, the 
court defined the issue as "whether Defendants can have the 
litigation settled for them by their insurance carrier."  App. at 
19.  The insurance policy at issue was not before the court but 
the court assumed for the sake of argument that the settlement 
clause, as we have quoted it supra, was in the policy.  The court 
concluded that under Pennsylvania law an insurance company would 
settle a case in bad faith if it settled "without regard to the 
fact that it may be barring a counterclaim of the insured."  App. 
at 20, quoting Bleday v. OUM Group, 645 A.2d 1358, 1363 (Pa. 
Super. 1994), allocatur denied 655 A.2d 981 (1955).  The court 
stated that it had to determine "whether Defendants have a 
reasonable likelihood of showing that their rights will be 
prejudiced by a settlement and that Vigilant was aware of this 
when it negotiated a settlement with Plaintiff."  App. at 21. 
Because Vigilant was aware that defendants wanted to sue Caplan 
for malicious prosecution and because a settlement would bar such 
an action, the court concluded that defendants had adequately 
demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits of 
their assertion that Vigilant had no authority to settle with 
Caplan on defendants' behalf.   
 Turning to irreparable injury, the court found that 
defendants would be damaged if a settlement eliminated their 
ability to sue Caplan for malicious prosecution.  As to harm to 
the other party, the court determined that Caplan would suffer 
from the delay in receiving her $200,000 check but this harm was 
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not greater than defendants' harm in losing their opportunity to 
clear their names.       
 Finally, the court found that Caplan and Vigilant went 
behind defendants' back to work out a settlement and that the 
public interest was not served "by taking away Defendants' right 
not to be buried without a fight, either at the settlement table 
or before a jury of their peers."  The court concluded that the 
defendants had satisfied the requirements for a preliminary 
injunction and "[d]ue to this showing, a preliminary injunction 
shall be entered."   
 In the accompanying Order, the court decreed that: 
 "the settlement entered into between 
Plaintiff and Defendants' Insurance Carrier 
on May 22, 1995 is hereby declared null and 
void.  It is hereby FURTHER ORDERED that 
Plaintiff is enjoined from entering into any 
settlement of this action unless Defendants 
are a party to such settlement." 
 
Caplan and Vigilant both appealed this order. 
 The district court had jurisdiction of this case under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  Our jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal will be the first issue discussed.  
                         II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
 Defendants-appellees, FEB&K and Braverman, contend 
first that the May 25 Order of the district court is not an 
appealable order, either as an injunction or under the collateral 
order exception to the final judgment requirement.  See Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  Because we 
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find that the order is appealable as an injunction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),2 we will not go on to consider either the 
collateral order exception or appellants' alternative petition 
for a writ of mandamus. 
 Our review of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal is 
plenary.  Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 
1002 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 Despite the language of their emergency motion and of 
their argument before the district court and despite the wording 
of the May 25 Order, defendants contend that the order is not an 
injunction nor is it the type of injunctive order which is 
appealable under § 1292(a)(1).  They assert instead that "this 
action by the Court was an exercise of its inherent and Rule 16 
supervisory powers to manage its docket and not an injunction." 
This supervisory power, they contend, is the power of the court 
to enforce or to undo a purported settlement.  The case cited by 
defendants to support this proposition is Fox v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 739 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 
1190 (1985), in which we affirmed the district court's refusal to 
reopen Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) cases which had 
been brought and then settled in the Pennsylvania state courts. 
                                                           
2Section 1292(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: 
 
(a)  [T]he courts of appeals shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from: 
(1)  Interlocutory orders of the 
district courts of the United States . . 
. granting, continuing, modifying, 
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or 
refusing to dissolve or modify 
injunctions . . .. 
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In Fox, we agreed with the district court that settlement 
agreements should be enforced in the same court in which the 
original litigation had taken place.  Id. at 932-33. 
 In support of their position that the May 25 Order was 
not an injunction, defendants also cite the case of Saber v. 
FinanceAmerica Credit Corp., 843 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1988) in which 
the district court had granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce a 
settlement agreement against defendants.  We dismissed the 
appeal, holding that an order to pay money under the settlement, 
a legal remedy, was "not transformed into an injunctive remedy 
merely by a district court's imposition of a time limit on the 
defendants' obligation to pay."  Id. at 702-03.3   
  In their efforts to demonstrate that the May 25 Order 
is not an injunction, defendants have also distinguished 
appealable injunctions from injunctions which were incidental to 
a pending action and which were unrelated to the substantive 
issues of the case.  See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery 
Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1279 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that orders that 
focus on procedural issues and do not grant or deny part of the 
substantive relief sought by claimant are not immediately 
appealable under § 1292(a)(1)). 
 Caplan and Vigilant, on the other hand, support their 
position that the May 25 Order is an appealable injunction by 
citing the case of Cohen v. Trustees of the Univ of Medicine & 
                                                           
3We did note in Saber that we were leaving undecided the question 
whether an order to pay money, enforceable by a contempt 
citation, was an injunction.  Id. at 703. 
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Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1464 (3d Cir. 1989) in which we 
held that an order by the district court, directing reinstatement 
of a medical school professor, was appealable because it granted 
part of the ultimate relief sought by the claimant. 
 We noted: 
For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), 
injunctions may be affirmatively defined as 
follows: 
 
Orders that are directed to a party, 
enforceable by contempt, and designed to 
accord or protect "some or all of the 
substantive relief sought by a 
complaint" in more than a [temporary] 
fashion. 
 
Id. at 1465 n.9 (brackets in original) (quoting Charles A. et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3922, at 29 (1977)).  We 
distinguished non-appealable injunctive orders as having in 
common the characteristic that "while significant, [they do] not 
either grant or deny the ultimate relief sought by the claimant." 
867 F.2d at 1464. 
 Reviewing the relevant case law, in light of the facts 
of the present case, we conclude that the May 25 Order is an 
appealable order because it does qualify as an injunction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  The order does not deal with pre-trial 
procedural issues.  See Hershey Foods, 945 F.2d at 1279.  It does 
not order the legal remedy of specific performance of the payment 
of a sum of money.  See Saber, 845 F.2d at 702-03. 
 The May 25 Order does attempt to undo a settlement. 
Even so, Fox, the case cited by appellees to support their 
position that approval of settlement orders is part of a district 
13 
court's supervisory powers, supports only a narrower proposition: 
that a federal court should not try to reopen a settlement 
arrived at in a case which was litigated and settled in state 
court.  Fox does not stand for the proposition that federal court 
judges may interject themselves into any particular case before 
them to pass on the propriety of the settlement in that case. 
 Our federal courts have neither the authority nor the 
resources to review and approve the settlement of every case 
brought in the federal court system.  There are only certain 
designated types of suits, for instance consent decrees, class 
actions, shareholder derivative suits, and compromises of 
bankruptcy claims where settlement of the suit requires court 
approval.  Cf. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th 
Cir. 1980), reh'g granted 625 F.2d 1310, aff'd in part, vacated 
in part, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc): 
 In what can be termed "ordinary 
litigation," that is, lawsuits brought by one 
private party against another private party 
that will not affect the rights of any other 
persons, settlement of the dispute is solely 
in the hands of the parties.  If the parties 
can agree to terms, they are free to settle 
the litigation at any time, and the court 
need not and should not get involved.   
 
* * * 
 
 Moreover, procedurally it would seem to 
be impossible for the judge to become 
involved in overseeing a settlement, because 
the parties are free at any time to agree to 
a resolution of the dispute by private 
contractual agreement, and to dismiss the 
lawsuit by stipulation.  In this situation, 
then, the trial court plays no role in 
overseeing or approving any settlement 
proposals. 
14 
614 F.2d at 1330.  See also Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 
1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[in] lawsuits between private 
parties, courts recognize that settlement of the dispute is 
solely in the hands of the parties."). 
 Defendants argue in opposition to this result that they 
did not consent to this settlement of the lawsuit because it is 
contrary to their interests.  It was only when Caplan and 
Vigilant started negotiating "behind defendants' backs" that a 
settlement was reached.  They contend that that settlement should 
not be effective since they were not a party to it.  What 
defendants overlook, however, is that in their contract with 
Vigilant for insurance coverage, they have authorized Vigilant to 
act as their agent to settle claims or suits as Vigilant thinks 
"appropriate."  Vigilant is not required by the policy to obtain 
the defendants' approval of any settlement.4    
 From our examination of facts of the present case, we 
conclude that the May 25 Order is an appealable injunction 
because it did deny the substantive relief sought by Maia Caplan. 
See Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1464.  Caplan's suit included a claim for 
damages.  She reached an advantageous settlement of that claim 
with defendants' insurance company, which was acting in its 
                                                           
4There are insurance policies which require the insured's consent 
to settlement.  Cf. Brion v. Vigilant Ins. co., 651 S.W.2d 183, 
184 (Mo. App. 1983) (holding that provision of insurance contract 
requiring insured's consent prior to settlement is essentially a 
"pride" provision which gives insured control over litigation 
affecting his reputation).  Had defendants elected to negotiate 
for a policy under which they had the right to approve settlement 
of litigation for which the insurer provided the defense, their 
position here would be justified.  Defendants, however, did not 
choose to purchase such a policy.   
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capacity as the agent defendants had authorized to settle claims 
for them.  Under the terms of the settlement, Caplan was to 
receive a payment of $200,000 in return for releasing all her 
claims against defendants.  By her agreement to the settlement, 
Caplan expressed her satisfaction with the relief she had 
obtained from the entire litigation.  The May 25 Order voided the 
settlement and denied Caplan the realization of that relief. 
 In addition, the May 25 Order would appear to be 
enforceable by contempt.  It does not say so in so many words but 
it implies as much in its commanding tone:  "Plaintiff is 
enjoined from entering into any settlement of this action unless 
Defendants are a party to such settlement."  Caplan would defy 
such an order at her peril.   
B. 
 Having determined that the May 25 Order is an 
appealable injunction under § 1292(a)(1), we turn to defendants' 
next argument  -- that Vigilant does not have standing to appeal 
that order because it was not a party of record before the 
district court.  Generally, it is true that those who were not 
parties before the district court may not appeal an order of the 
district court.  We have, however, recognized that a non-party 
may bring an appeal in a situation where three conditions are 
met:  1) the equities favor the appeal; 2) the non-party has 
participated in some way in the proceedings before the district 
court; and 3) the non-party has a stake in the outcome of the 
district court proceedings, which is discernable from the record. 
Binker v. Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
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EEOC v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 897 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 (1990)). 
 Defendants assert that Vigilant does not qualify under 
the Binker test because it had a chance to intervene in the 
district court but chose not to do so, because its interests are 
adequately represented by Caplan, because it can still negotiate 
a settlement with Caplan as long as the defendants are also 
present, and because it can still negotiate a policy release with 
the defendants.   
 The defendants do acknowledge that Vigilant did 
participate in the hearing on defendants' emergency motion, over 
their objections, and that Vigilant has a stake in the appeal 
"because without a settlement it must continue to fulfill its 
duty to defend."  Appellees' Brief at 33 n.8.  With these 
concessions, the only Binker factor left for us to determine is 
whether the equities favor permitting Vigilant to join in this 
appeal.  We conclude that Vigilant's interest, both specifically 
in this case and generally in upholding its contractual terms 
with its policy holders, is adequate to satisfy the Binker 
factors.  The fact that Vigilant may still negotiate a settlement 
which meets with defendants' approval should not preclude it from 
asserting its interest in completing the settlement with Caplan 
which it negotiated, pursuant to its contractual agreement with 
defendants.  Any other result would require Vigilant to expend 
further defense costs in a suit which it had terminated in a 
manner expressly permitted by the terms of the policy.      
17 
 Our evaluation of the equitiesnding of bad faith in 
settlement has been made against an insurer. Sh and that this 
misconduct on Vigilant's part should trump the provisions of the 
insurance contract.  Defendants are correct in their contentions 
that they cannot pursue an action for malicious prosecution 
against Caplan unless Caplan's suit against them is terminated 
favorably to them and that under Pennsylvania law a settlement is 
not considered to be a favorable termination.  See, e.g., Junod 
v. Bader, 458 A.2d 251 (Pa. Super. 1983).  However, the language 
in FEB&K's policy with Vigilant expressly authorizes Vigilant to 
settle suits as Vigilant deems appropriate.  This grant of 
discretion to Vigilant permits it, in its evaluation of a 
settlement, to consider factors such as the likelihood of 
defendants being found liable, the cost to Vigilant of defense of 
the suit, the impression which various parties and witnesses may 
make at the trial, the strength of the evidence, and the nuisance 
value of the claim.  Cf. Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. 
Physicians' Professional Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 
1992) (interpreting "deems expedient" provision to grant insurer 
exclusive authority to control settlement, guided by its own 
self-interest, including settlement for nuisance value of the 
claim).5  This type of provision also permits the insurer to 
settle a suit that presents no valid claim against the 
defendants.  See, e.g., Marginian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 
                                                           
5A policy provision that the insurer may settle a suit it "deems 
expedient" is similar to the "settle when appropriate" provision 
found here. 
18 
N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ohio 1985) (interpreting "deems appropriate" 
provision to give insurer right to settle on behalf of insured 
even if claims are fraudulent or groundless).  In view then of 
the construction which has been given to this type of policy 
language, we cannot see that Vigilant acted in bad faith in 
arriving at a settlement with Caplan without first obtaining 
defendants' approval of the terms of settlement.  
 Moreover, the claim by defendants of bad faith on 
Vigilant's part is not directed to that category of actions by an 
insurer where the courts most often have found bad faith by an 
insurer in settlement.  It is primarily in cases of an insurer's 
failure or refusal to settle within policy limits that a finding 
of bad faith in settlement has been made against an insurer. See, 
e.g., Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 A.2d at 322 
(holding that insurer assumes a duty to act in good faith and is 
derelict where it unreasonably refuses an offer of settlement); 
Marginian, 481 N.E.2d at 603 (finding that a common thread 
running through most bad faith settlement claims is that insurer 
failed to settle within policy limits); 7C John Alan Appleman, 
Insurance Law & Practice (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979) §§ 4711, 
4712.   
 Cases are much rarer in which an insured claims bad 
faith because the insurer has settled within the policy limits. 
See Jon Epstein, Annotation, Liability of Insurer to Insured for 
Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in 
Detriment to Insured, 18 ALR5th 474 (1994).  It is that type of 
claim, arising from a settlement within policy limits, which is 
19 
defendants' basis for arguing that the settlement here should be 
voided because Vigilant's bad faith will prevent defendants from 
recovering from Caplan for their alleged loss of business and 
harm to their reputations.  Defendants' position is based on 
Bleday, 645 A.2d 1358.  In Bleday, however, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court held that the insured's complaints of increased 
insurance premiums, loss of business, and harm to reputation 
would not support a cause of action under Pennsylvania law 
against an insurer for bad faith in settling a suit within policy 
limits:  
We cannot find, in a situation where the 
insured freely enters into an insurance 
contract with "deems expedient" language, 
that an insurer has settled a claim in bad 
faith when these types of damages may occur 
prospectively. 
Id. at 1363.  Bleday does not then support defendants' position 
that Vigilant's actions in settling with Caplan amount to bad 
faith by Vigilant toward defendants. 
 Vigilant argues that it should not be required to seek 
the consent of the insured to settle in the absence of a 
provision in the policy that such consent was required. 
Vigilant's position in making this contention is supported by 
Pennsylvania law.  Indeed, Vigilant might be exposed to a finding 
of unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of 
insurance under Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act 
(UIPA), 40 P.S. §§ 1171.1 et seq., if it made a practice of: 
(xv) Refusing payment of a claim solely on 
the basis of an insured's request to do so 
unless: 
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(a) The insured claims sovereign, 
eleemosynary, diplomatic, military service, 
or other immunity from suit or liability with 
respect to such claim; 
 
(b) The insured is granted the right under 
the policy of insurance to consent to 
settlement of claims; or 
 
(c) the refusal of payment is based upon the 
insurer's independent evaluation of the 
insured's liability based upon all available 
information. 
40 P.S. § 1171.55(a)(xv)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). 
 Section 1171.5(a)(xv)(b) of the UIPA demonstrates that 
the Pennsylvania legislature recognizes the significance of an 
insured's consent to settle provision in an insurance policy. 
Such a consent-to-settle provision protects the professional, 
such as a doctor or a lawyer, who is concerned about his or her 
reputation.  See, e.g., Feliberty v. Damon, 527 N.E.2d 261, 262 
(N.Y. 1988); Brion v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Mo. 
App. 1983).  An insured's subjective opposition to settlement for 
reasons such as reputation may impede an insurer from settling 
with a third party.  The Pennsylvania legislature has, however, 
established the policy that, unless the insurance contract so 
provides, insurers may not delay settling with third parties on 
the ground that the insured objects to settlement.  If Vigilant 
is prevented from settling the present case, it may find itself 
unable to settle other cases involving Pennsylvania insureds who 
are unwilling to consent.  Such a practice by Vigilant would 
violate the UIPA. 
 We find, therefore, that the equities favor permitting 
Vigilant to appeal an injunction that would void this settlement. 
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Vigilant has a strong interest in upholding the provisions of its 
insurance policy.  Moreover, under Bleday, the damages defendants 
are claiming, as a result of bad faith in settlement, are not 
recognized under Pennsylvania law as supporting a claim of bad 
faith by the insured against the insurer.  In addition, under the 
UIPA, Vigilant could be found to be engaging in unfair insurance 
practices if it made a practice of refusing to settle claims 
under a "settle when appropriate" policy simply because the 
insured opposed settlement.  
 The district court came to a different conclusion, 
citing Bleday, 645 A.2d 1358, for the proposition that "settle 
when appropriate" language in an insurance policy does not give 
an insurer the power to settle a case when that settlement is in 
bad faith and is contrary to the intent and expectation of the 
parties.  Defendants also rely on Bleday to support their 
position that an insurance company cannot settle a suit over the 
objection of the insured if that action would have the effect of 
extinguishing a claim of the insured. 
 The district court's and the defendants' reliance on 
those aspects of Bleday is, however, unpersuasive.  In Bleday the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court was considering the insurer's 
authority to settle a suit when such a settlement would 
extinguish an existing counterclaim in that same suit.6  The 
                                                           
6This concept, that settlement and consequent dismissal of an 
action should not result in the dismissal of an existing 
counterclaim, is also recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Dismissal of an action in which a counterclaim has 
been filed is barred under Rule 41(a)(2) when the defendant 
objects "[i]f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
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counterclaim which defendants had filed in the present suit had, 
however, already been dismissed by the district court as 
premature.  Vigilant's settlement with Caplan has no effect on 
that no-longer-existent counterclaim.  The fact that the 
settlement may have an effect on a future action which defendants 
would like to bring against Caplan is an entirely different issue 
from the one discussed in Bleday. 
 Finally, although Caplan may, as defendants claim, have 
a common interest with Vigilant in enforcing the settlement she 
negotiated, Vigilant's interest is broader than Caplan's because 
of the effect the May 25 Order may have on Vigilant's policies 
with other insureds. 
 We conclude, therefore, that the equities support 
permitting Vigilant to participate in this appeal.7 
C. 
 Having determined that the May 25 Order is appealable 
and that Vigilant is a proper party to the appeal, we next turn 
to the question of whether the district court properly issued the 
preliminary injunction.  We conclude that the district court 
erred in granting the injunction because the court misinterpreted 
the clear language of the insurance policy and because it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prior to the service upon the defendant of the plaintiff's motion 
to dismiss . . . unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court."  
7Because we have determined that Vigilant may join in this 
appeal, we will not go on to analyze appellants' claim that 
Vigilant was a necessary party to the district court proceedings 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. 
23 
incorrectly analyzed the factors of irreparable injury and of 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
 We review the district court's granting of the 
injunction to determine whether the court abused its discretion, 
committed an obvious error in applying the law, or made a serious 
mistake in considering the proof.  In re Assets of Myles Martin, 
1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The first factor we will review is irreparable injury. 
The consideration of the factor of irreparable injury is relevant 
to the granting of a preliminary injunction because the purpose 
of such an injunction is to protect the moving party from 
irreparable injury until the court can render a meaningful 
decision on the merits.  See 11A Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice & Procedure 2D § 2947 (1995).   
 In order to demonstrate irreparable harm 
the [moving party] must demonstrate potential 
harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or 
an equitable remedy following a trial.  The 
preliminary injunction must be the only way 
of protecting the [moving party] from harm. 
Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 
801 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 The district court defined the irreparable harm to 
defendants here as the damage to their ability to seek legal 
redress against Caplan in a malicious prosecution action.  App. 
at 23.  The outcome of the present action will of course 
determine defendants' ability to sue Caplan because they cannot 
do so unless this action terminates favorably to them.  The 
termination which defendants fear is a settlement like the one 
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negotiated by Caplan and Vigilant.  But defendants contracted 
with Vigilant to authorize Vigilant to settle this litigation. 
Because defendants have acted to permit the outcome which they 
find unacceptable, we must conclude that such an outcome is not 
an irreparable injury.  If the harm complained of is self-
inflicted, it does not qualify as irreparable.  See 11A Charles 
A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 pp. 152-53 
(1995). 
 We conclude, therefore, that the harm of which 
defendants complain is not irreparable.  Moreover, with this 
finding, the balancing of harms shifts to weigh in favor of Maia 
Caplan.  If the present settlement is voided and defendants 
required to agree to any future settlement, Caplan at the least 
faces a delay in receiving the negotiated settlement amount.  In 
addition she may be forced to undergo further stress and 
harassment by having to continue in this litigation which she had 
settled favorably to her interests. 
 We next consider the factor of likelihood of success on 
the merits.  The district court defined likelihood of success as 
being "not the merits of the litigation between Plaintiff and 
Defendants, but the question whether Defendants can have the 
litigation settled for them by their insurance carrier."  App. at 
19.  The district court concluded that "Defendants have a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits of their 
assertion that Vigilant has no authority to make this settlement 
with Plaintiff on Defendants' behalf."  App. at 22. 
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 The language of the policy, however, clearly provides 
for Vigilant to settle suits in which it is defending claims. 
Vigilant is required under Pennsylvania law to defend all claims 
in a suit if at least one claim is covered by the policy.  See 
American Contract Bridge League, 752 F.2d at 75.  Because the 
policy language permits Vigilant to settle a suit it is 
defending, it may do so whether or not all claims in the suit are 
covered by the policy.  There is no provision which limits 
settlement of suits to those in which only covered claims are 
being defended by the insurer.  It is not unusual for an 
insurance company to make a reservation of rights in defending a 
suit, as to certain of the claims made in the complaint or as to 
coverage periods or as to certain named defendants or as to the 
whole claim because of untimely notification by the insured. 
Under the policy language, the sole determination required of 
Vigilant in settling a suit is that it thinks the settlement is 
appropriate.   
 As we have discussed in Part II. B above, this 
settlement provision should be enforced as expressed in the 
policy.  If for reasons of professional reputation an insured 
wishes to control the settlement of cases, policies are available 
which provide that protection.  FEB&K did not, however, purchase 
this type of coverage.  It is not appropriate for us to amend the 
policy here in order to give FEB&K a type of coverage for which 
it didn't contract.  Cf. Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 1979) ("it is not 
the function of the court to redraft a contract to be more 
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favorable to a given party than the agreement he chose to 
enter.").  
 Because we conclude that the policy should be enforced 
as written, we consequently conclude that the defendants did not 
have a likelihood of prevailing in their claim that Vigilant had 
no authority to make the settlement with Caplan on defendants' 
behalf.  Defendants cannot succeed in their efforts to void a 
settlement which we have determined was appropriately arrived at 
and which will terminate this case.  For this reason, we find 
that the district court erred in its analysis of likelihood of 
success on the merits. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 Because we find that the district court improperly 
determined both that defendants would suffer irreparable harm if 
the settlement of the case was permitted to remain in effect and 
that defendants were likely to succeed in their assertion that 
Vigilant was not authorized to settle with Maia Caplan on behalf 
of defendants, we conclude that the court erred in granting the 
relief which it did in its May 25 Order.  We will reverse the 
Order of May 25, voiding the settlement and enjoining Caplan from 
entering into any settlement unless defendants were a party to 
that settlement.  We will remand the case to the district court 
with directions to dismiss it with prejudice when the stipulation 
of dismissal, signed by Caplan's counsel, has been filed with the 
court. 
